Husserl’s Preemptive Responses to Existentialist Critiques by MacDonald, Paul S
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 1, Edition 1        April 2001 Page 1 of 13 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This document is subject to 
copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the 
publishers. 
 





Husserl’s Preemptive Responses to Existentialist Critiques 
 





Existentialist thinkers often publicly acknowledged Husserl’s phenomenology as one of their main 
points of departure for treatment of such themes as intentionality, comportment, transcendence, 
and the lifeworld.  Several central elements of Husserl’s approach were adopted by the 
Existentialists, but equal to their gratitude were vigorous declamations of Husserl’s mistakes, 
dead-ends and failures. Many of the Existentialists’ criticisms of Husserl’s project are well-known 
and have been rehearsed in various surveys of 20th century thought, but less well-remarked are the 
discrepancies between their complaints about Husserl’s aborted achievements and what Husserl 
actually delivered. This paper attempts to uncover the accuracy of some of their assessments of 
Husserl’s alleged failures and mistakes, whether or not Husserl actually held the position they 
claim he did, and especially whether or not Husserl was himself aware of some deficiency in his 
thematic analysis, and thus would have been able to offer a cogent response to critique. In doing 
so, a good case can be made that Heidegger, for example, quietly adopted some of Husserl’s main 
insights without credit, slanted his picture of Husserl’s work so that his own reversals had better 
purchase, or overlooked evidence that Husserl had already moved beyond that position. At least 
on some key topics, Husserl emerges as an exceptionally self-critical philosopher who had already 
gained the perspective more usually associated with an Existentialist orientation. 
 
 
Existentialist thinkers since the 1930s owe a great 
deal to Husserl’s phenomenology; Heidegger, Jaspers, 
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Ortega all repeatedly 
acknowledged in print that one of their points of 
departure was Husserl’s phenomenological approach. 
The central elements of Husserl’s approach adopted 
by these Existentialists are as follows: first, the 
rejection of Cartesian substance dualism, i.e., the 
doctrine that the mind and body are distinct things 
with determinate essences, causally and hence 
contingently connected (although this was not as 
evident until the publication of Ideas Second Book.) 
Second, the core doctrine of intentionality according 
to which the distinctive feature of consciousness is 
that it is mentally directed towards its ‘objects’. 
Third, the discursive prohibition not to employ 
traditional philosophical vocabulary and instead to 
describe the phenomena exactly as and only as they 
appear to conscious being. Fourth, Husserl’s repeated 
summons to make philosophical understanding one’s 
own through a process of self-discovery and self-
liberation (Cooper, 1999, pp. 46-47). And fifth, an 
insistence on the priority of the lifeworld over the 
theoretical world of the natural sciences. Equal to the 
Existentialists’ acknowledgment of their debt to 
Husserl was their vigorous declamation of his 
mistakes, dead-ends and failures. It seems to have 
been vitally important to thinkers in the 1920s and 
1930s to create as much distance as possible between 
themselves and their former ‘master’. Less well-
remarked perhaps is the discrepancy between the 
Existentialists’ complaints about Husserl’s aborted 
achievements and what Husserl actually delivered. 
This paper argues that it is not a mere academic point 
whether Heidegger or Sartre accurately characterize 
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Husserlian arguments in their condemnation, since 
any positive claim which is founded on the rebuttal of 
a negative claim must be weighed in part on the 
‘purchase’ of the prior negative claim. In other words, 
your criticism of an incorrect claim is (at least partly) 
dependent on how accurately you have assessed the 
original position. Husserl’s protracted reflections on 
any given issue are peculiarly difficult to expound, 
and collaterally it is often very hard to identify a 
specific doctrine or discursive position in such a way 
that it is clear what assertion his critic is attempting to 
rebut. At any given time, Husserl the meditator was 
rarely satisfied with the present state of his written 
work; his analytic studies were “a process of endless 
corrections and revisions.” The few works that he 
published in his lifetime look like “purely momentary 
states of rest, or ‘condensations’ of a thought 
movement that was constantly in flux” (Bernet, Kern  
& Marbach, p. 2). It is thus a tricky business to hold 
still one ‘moment’ long enough to say, “if this stands, 
then it’s wrong”. Husserl’s thought on core 
phenomenological notions never stood still; he was, 
in his own memorable image, “an endless beginner”, 
and would be the first to open a new path when the 
woods became lost in the trees. In some cases, his 
thought movement was already running ahead of his 
critics, far enough into the future that today, although 
there are few (if any) avowed Existentialists, there are 
very many Husserlian phenomenologists. Heidegger’s 
constant early references to pathmarks, pathways, and 
so forth (see esp. van Buren, 1994, pp. 5-9) are 
preceded by Husserl’s own favorite imagery of 
phenomenology as a series of paths, a journey, or a 
voyage (see MacDonald, 2000, pp. 82-85). 
Some of the Existentialists’ specific criticisms of 
Husserl’s assumptions and approach are as follows. 
First, for Husserl, the dominant dimension of 
intentional directedness is cognitive, that is, analysis 
of the total unity of intentional act-and-object is 
calculative and componential. Second, he accords the 
greatest epistemic weight for human understanding on 
rational insight and higher-order intuition, specifically 
the ability to reflect on one’s experiences. Third, the 
transcendental ego as uncovered through the 
reduction is a detached spectator, unengaged with the 
common sense world and its everyday things. Fourth, 
consciousness is conceived as a monadic unity 
through which, or into which, nothing can penetrate; 
this conception leads to an irretrievable solipsism. 
Fifth, the final stage of the reduction is meant to bring 
about an exact science of essences, i.e., material and 
spiritual essences, correlative to the categories of a 
formal ontology; but one thing, human being, resists 
such categorization since it does not have an essence. 
Sixth, and perhaps most damning, the absolutely 
necessary technique of phenomenological epoché that 
brackets the world’s being cannot be fully performed, 
that is, at least not without seriously damaging the 
actual relation that conscious beings have with their 
world. 
This capsulated critique, however, does not take 
adequate account of Husserl’s own answers to some 
of these charges; though, of course, like any thought-
capsule it’s handy for didactic purposes. Over and 
over again, for more than twelve years, between 1912 
and 1915, Husserl worked on clean copies of the 
Second and Third Books of the Ideas. One after the 
other, his personal assistants prepared new drafts, 
only to have them returned later revised and 
corrected; they despaired that the other parts of his 
great work would never reach publication. But 
Heidegger read the manuscript version two years 
before the publication of his Being and Time in 1927 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 469, note ii), and Merleau-Ponty 
read them, in “a near rhapsody of excitement” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1996, Appendix), just before the 
outbreak of war in 1939. Many of the charges leveled 
against Husserl have responses in these texts, and 
more than just responses, they further Husserl’s 
project into an emergent existential and inter-
subjective phenomenology. What Husserl in The 
Crisis of European Sciences (1936) calls the lifeworld 
(Lebenswelt) in Ideas Book Two he calls the 
surround-world (umwelt), an idea conveyed very 
nicely by the word environ-ment. (See D. W. Smith, 
in Smith & Smith, 1995, pp. 360-362; J. C. Evans, in 
Nenon & Embree, 1996, pp. 57-65.) The umwelt is 
one’s immediate environment; the world which 
surrounds an animate conscious being is already 
structured in determinate ways, i.e., things and 
persons and events already have value before 
predicative judgments are made about them. 
The surround-world is in a certain way 
always in the process of becoming …. To 
begin with, the world is, in its core, a world 
appearing to the senses and characterized as 
on hand, a world given in straightforward 
empirical intuitions and perhaps grasped 
actively. (Husserl, 1989, p. 196) 
This low level, non-reflective engagement with handy 
things, items that fit in one’s hand, is not just gauged 
in use-terms, it also uncovers the direct grasp with 
value-terms.  Husserl continues: 
The ego then finds itself related to this 
empirical world in new acts, e.g. in acts of 
valuing or in acts of pleasure and 
displeasure…. There is built upon the 
substratum of mere intuitive representing an 
evaluating which (if we presuppose it) plays in 
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the immediacy of its lively motivation, the role 
of value-perception … in which the value 
character itself is given in original intuition. 
(ibid.) 
Husserl’s comments on the cognitive grasp of use-
value that is embedded in ordinary worldly entities is 
strikingly similar to Heidegger’s better known 
exposition of the different ‘kinds’ of items found in 
one’s environment. Such ordinary mundane items are 
either available, ‘at’ hand (zuhanden), or they are 
occurent, ‘for’ hand (vorhanden); for example, the 
hammer grasped as an item imbued with use or 
service, in contrast with an ‘inert’ piece of metal or 
wood. This notion of originary value-perception is 
hardly surprising since Husserl goes on to illustrate 
the notion of an object “apprehendable as in the 
service of the satisfaction of such needs” as hunger 
and warmth with “heating materials, choppers, 
hammers, etc.” He then goes on to say that such 
items-on-hand are directly grasped as use-objects, in 
contrast with those that do not have use-value, objects 
just lying about. This is not an operation of explicit 
awareness, no judgment is formed by means of which 
one could infer or derive value; it is thus a pre-
predicative awareness, or as Sartre has put it, 
prereflective consciousness. These useful items are 
associated in the surround-world through “a web of 
intentions”, interlinked by way of meaningful 
indications, much in the same fashion that Heidegger 
describes the environing world of the ready-to-hand 
as “a referential totality.” One’s experience of the 
manifold connections of all use-objects, artifacts and 
cultural products, says Husserl, is an experience of 
motivated relations. 
Long before the earliest draft of the sections of Being 
and Time devoted to this topic (e.g. in the lectures on 
the History of the Concept of Time), Husserl had 
clearly underlined the need to make explicit, or bring 
to the fore, the pre-theoretical ‘meaning’ attached to 
or embedded in useful versus inert objects. In his 
Lectures on Nature and Spirit from 1919, he states, 
I understand the significational unity that the 
word ‘hammer’ expresses by relating it back to 
that which posits the end, to the subject 
creating at any time useful means for 
purposeful productions of a definite type. 
The practical and bodily grasp of useful meanings, 
i.e., items endowed with meaning for use, is built on 
an essential understanding of motivational relations 
which extend through and beyond those particular 
items. 
All significance objectivities and significance 
predicates are judged in their manner of 
correlation as rational and irrational. [In this 
sense of ‘rational’] the hammer is ‘to be 
useful’, but it can be a good or a bad 
hammer…. The ‘is to be’ expresses the 
pretention [forward-directed intention], it 
expresses that it stands under the ideas of 
reason. (Husserl, in Nenon & Embree, 1996, 
pp. 9, 10) 
 In his exposition of this and associated texts, Ulrich 
Melle quotes from another manuscript: 
in our everyday experience we apperceive our 
environment so immediately with spiritual 
predicates of meaning, “that these predicates 
are downright designated as perceived, as 
seen, as heard, etc., just as the real predicates 
which are given in the most immediate 
sensuous experience. (ibid, 1996, p. 24) 
Husserl does make an attempt to account for human 
practical understanding of use-endowed items in the 
world of its immediate concern. The use which an 
item has for its user motivates (not causes) one to take 
it up, as well as inspiring other motivations tied in 
with other use-objects. 
They now engage [the ego’s] interest in their 
being and attributes, in their beauty, 
agreeableness, and usefulness; they stimulate 
its desire to delight in them, play with them, 
use them as a means, transform them 
according to its purposes, etc. … In a very 
broad sense, we can also denote the personal 
or motivational attitude as the practical 
attitude. (Husserl, 1989, p. 199) 
Edmund Husserl’s endorsement of the importance of 
practice, moreover the background of shared practices 
(much discussed recently by Hubert Dreyfus and John 
Searle) leads us to an answer to one of the other 
charges against Husserl, that is, his alleged emphasis 
on theory at the expense of practice, and of reflection 
to the detriment of lived action (see Barry Smith, in 
Smith & Smith, 1995, pp. 413-415). However, to 
denigrate Husserl’s supposed reliance on theoretical 
insight in his elaboration of intentional structures of 
consciousness is to ignore his explicit subordination 
of theory in the transition to consideration of the 
human being in its psychical constitution.  
What we are seeking does not lie in the 
consequences of theoretical, mediate thinking 
but in its beginnings; we are looking for its 
most originary presuppositions… Legitimate 
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theory cannot accomplish anything other than 
the predicative determination, in mediate 
thinking, of that which was first posited by 
originary presenting intuition (in our case 
experience)…. There what the ‘analysis of 
origin’ has drawn from originary intuition as 
the originary sense of the object cannot be 
annulled by any theory. It is the norm which 
must be presupposed and to which all possible 
theoretical cognition is rationally bound. 
(Husserl, 1989, pp. 96-97) 
To adopt a theoretical or detached attitude towards 
pre-theoretical, pre-reflective consciousness is like 
attempting to compel an umpire or referee to perform 
his function while acting like a player on the field. 
One cannot surreptitiously import a detached observer 
who is obliged to report on what it feels like (from the 
inside, so to speak) to be an engaged, unreflective 
agent in a field of action and motion. Husserl himself 
was aware of the possible slippage between a 
theoretical attitude about the origins and structures of 
the lifeworld into a belief that a theoretical attitude 
can be found within the lifeworld. The danger here is 
that one might be tempted to unwittingly insert 
backward into one’s lifeworld analysis an observer’s 
point-of-view which is then ‘discovered’ to be in 
place after reflection. Perhaps the Cartesian 
meditative ego, contingently connected to its body, 
could become detached enough from its surroundings, 
and could indeed “float above this world, above this 
life”, but Husserl’s human being is intimately bound 
together with its body. 
However, it is another serious question whether or 
not Heidegger’s exposition of the meaning of being as 
the preeminent phenomenon of human being-in-the-
world can be reduced to or entirely explained in terms 
of the background of social practices, as Hubert 
Dreyfus has attempted in Being-in-the-world.  
Dreyfus’ highly influential interpretation of 
Heidegger’s criticisms of Husserl’s concepts of 
intentionality, the detached spectator, the self-
constituting subject, and so forth, grossly fail to take 
account of other relevant Husserlian texts on the 
issues in question. Follesdal reported that after 
Husserl came to Freiburg in 1916, 
he clearly became more and more aware that 
our practical activity is an important part of 
our relation to the world…. There is, 
according to Husserl, “an infinite chain of 
goals, aims, and tasks” that our actions and 
their products relate to. 
Follesdal attempts to descry who deserves the credit 
for first grasping the phenomenological significance 
of human understanding via the circumspect 
background of practical activities, about which he 
states, 
Husserl had ideas similar to those of 
Heidegger long before Being and Time was 
published. These ideas started appearing in 
Husserl shortly after he arrived in Freiburg 
and met Heidegger in 1916. It is possible 
that Husserl influenced Heidegger in this 
‘practical’ direction…. However, it is also 
possible that it was Husserl who was 
influenced in this direction through his 
discussion with the younger Heidegger. 
(Follesdal, 1979, pp. 372, 376) 
Dreyfus quotes Mark Okrent in his footnotes to the 
effect that 
As soon as one realizes that, for Heidegger, 
intentionality is always practical rather than 
cognitive and that the primary form of 
intending is doing something for a purpose 
rather than being conscious of something, 
the structural analogies between the 
argument strategies of Husserl and 
Heidegger become apparent. (Okrent, 1988, 
p. 10, in Dreyfus, 1992, p. 345, note 6) 
Even with such well-informed guiding clues, Dreyfus 
is dismissive and contemptuous; he says that the 
question raised by Follesdal is “irrelevant” (1992, p. 
48) and that Husserl “never worked out a theory of 
action.” (ibid, p. 55) It seems eminently clear that 
Dreyfus was completely oblivious of Husserl’s Ideas 
Second Book (available in German since 1952, and 
translated into English in 1989), with its thorough and 
fine-grained analysis of action; Kristana Arp (in 
Nenon & Embree, 1996, pp. 161-171) and Lester 
Embree (in ibid, pp. 173-198) have presented some of 
Husserl’s central arguments in a fashion which 
effectively demolishes Dreyfus’ claims. 
Herman Philipse has argued very strongly against 
both the unitarian interpretation of Heidegger’s 
philosophy of being, according to which there is one 
more or less precise meaning of the overarching 
question that remains the same through all his 
philosophical career, and against the patchwork 
interpretation according to which Heidegger employs 
disparate and sometimes incompatible materials 
where the being-question is “a chameleon that 
changes its meaning from passage to passage.” 
Philipse considers Dreyfus’ interpretation to be one 
of the best known (and most misleading) of the 
unitarian expositions, one that basically falsifies and 
distorts both Heidegger’s reliance on core Husserlian 
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insights and the character of Heidegger’s genuine and 
special transformation of traditional philosophical 
inquiry. Dreyfus’ interpretation of Heidegger’s later 
works, he stridently says, is “altogether implausible.” 
In arguing vehemently against his efforts to bring 
Heidegger in from the cold, Philipse does not mince 
his words. 
Dreyfus’ Heidegger is a domesticated 
Heidegger, made salonfähig [“lounge-safe”, 
respectable] for American academic circles by 
reducing him to a pragmatist or to a 
Wittgensteinian philosopher. In order to 
domesticate Heidegger, Dreyfus has to 
exorcise those aspects of Heidegger’s later 
thought which suggest that the “ungrounded 
ground” of all intelligibility does not reside in 
social practices at all, but in Being as some 
kind of absent god. This latter, “theological” 
interpretation… squarely contradicts Dreyfus’ 
conviction that according to Heidegger the 
source of all intelligibility is not hidden but 
lies open to view in our background practices. 
(Philipse, 1998, p. 69) 
In contrast to the unitarian and patchwork 
interpretative approaches, Philipse proposes an 
approach focused on the leitmotifs in Heidegger’s 
oeuvre (as in Wagner’s operas): 
there are a number of leitmotifs that are 
skillfully interwoven to produce the desired 
effect. One may be deeply impressed by these 
texts and feel that something important is 
going on, but will not clearly understand what 
it is unless one analyzes the leitmotifs and 
studies their interweavings. (Philipse, 1998, p. 
75) 
He claims to have identified five such leitmotifs, 
which are: (a) the meta-Aristotelian theme, (b) the 
phenomenological hermeneutic theme, (c) the 
transcendental theme, (d) the Neo-Hegelian theme, 
and (e) the post-monotheist theme. However, lest this 
approach seem equivalent to the patchwork approach, 
the author quickly points out that all five themes have 
formal unity; 
the five fundamental structures of Heidegger’s 
question of being are interconnected by means 
of a formal analogy, or by a common 
‘grammar’, which consists of nine formal 
features. In each of the five leitmotifs, these 
formal features are provided with a somewhat 
different semantic content. (ibid, p. 76) 
It is not pertinent for our present study to outline and 
evaluate these nine formal features; rather, our 
attention is focused on the substantial evidence 
offered in support of the second theme, which is the 
Husserlian phenomenological motif. Fred Olafson has 
strongly objected to the sorts of conclusions that 
Philipse draws from this approach and asserts that his 
account of Heidegger’s concept of being is basically 
mistaken. In treating Heidegger’s concept as an 
amalgam of previous themes, Philipse offers no hint 
of “the utterly different ontology of the human subject 
that is [his] most original contribution.” For Olafson, 
Philipse’s Heidegger has appropriated the best 
features of Husserl’s insights into formal indication, 
categorical intuition, and intentional comportment, 
and Kant’s transcendental grounding of metaphysical 
inquiry, the result of which is that the world is 
supposed to be constituted by the meaning-giving 
activity of the transcendental subject. 
The whole conception of human being as 
Dasein and being-in-the-world goes by the 
board….. The only sense in which the 
author’s evident intention of demolishing 
every thesis Heidegger defends succeeds 
that nothing recognizably Heideggerian 
emerges from the account he gives. 
(Olafson, 1999) 
The recent publication of Heidegger’s lecture notes 
from the Marburg years preceding the early drafts of 
Being and Time has provoked some radical 
reassessments of Heidegger’s dependence on the 
Husserl unpublished lectures and private meditations. 
(Our current knowledge of this material is largely the 
result of archival digging by Theodore Kisiel.) 
Dermot Moran, for example, has argued that this 
lecture material shows that Heidegger has creatively 
developed crucial elements in his mentor’s approach 
to the ontological dimension of intentionality, and not 
reversed or abandoned Husserl’s account. Further, 
Husserl’s account of cognitive intentionality, while 
recognizing the importance of the disinterested 
theoretical attitude for scientific knowledge, was 
underestimated and misunderstood by Heidegger, 
who treats scientific cognition as a deficient form of 
practice (Moran, 2000). Steven Crowell has 
persuasively argued in several papers that archival 
sources behind the ill-fated Encyclopedia Britannica 
article on phenomenology, edited and resubmitted by 
his assistant, do not show that Heidegger rejected 
Husserl’s transcendental position, but rather that the 
younger philosopher disagreed over the status of the 
ego; in preferring to treat the ego as an ontological 
achievement, Heidegger shows his dependence on 
Husserl’s transcendental reduction regarding the 
constitution of meaning (Crowell, 1990). In another 
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paper concerned with the early Marburg lectures, 
Crowell argues that Heidegger’s attention to the 
categories of factical life was motivated by the 
transcendental question of the possibility of 
knowledge in the philosophical sense. As such, 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic method, extolled in the 
Introduction to Being and Time, is another creative 
development, rather than rejection of the 
phenomenological notion of reflection (Crowell, 
1999). 
Daniel Dahlstrom has opened a line of inquiry about 
whether Heidegger fairly presented Husserl’s thought 
on intentionality and inner time consciousness, and 
whether he actually overcomes and corrects these 
alleged failures. Heidegger portrayed Husserl as the 
Moses of traditional philosophy,  
at once its liberator and its victim, pointing the 
way out of the desert through a clarification of 
intentionality, but unable to enter the promised 
land of existential analysis. (Dahlstrom, in 
Kisiel & van Buren, 1994, p. 231) 
According to Heidegger in these early lecture notes, 
Husserl’s phenomenology leaves unanswered the 
question of the ontological status of intentionality, or 
more properly, intentional being, and the meaning of 
being as such, both themes central to Husserl’s 
exposition of the primary reality of consciousness. 
According to his protégé’s critique, Husserl accepts 
and then employs a traditional prejudice that separates 
at the deepest level the being of consciousness and the 
being of particular existents. 
Husserl’s specific characterization of being in 
a primary sense, as what is absolutely given in 
pure consciousness, is based on an attempt to 
elaborate, not what “to be” means, but rather 
what is necessary for consciousness to 
constitute an “absolute science”. For the 
phenomenologist above all, the failure to raise 
the question of what “to be” means is of a 
piece with a failure to unpack what “to be” 
means in the case of a particular sort of being 
(Seiendes), namely, consciousness, understood 
as “intentionality”. This twin failure is, 
moreover, the direct result of an infidelity to 
phenomenology’s most basic principle. (ibid, 
p. 237) 
Heidegger does acknowledge Husserl’s unpublished 
work after Ideas First Book (1913), made efforts to 
go beyond some of the difficulties identified above, 
and admits that some of his own criticisms may now 
be outdated. But in spite of his mentor’s best efforts 
the basic, more general objection still holds with 
respect to phenomenology’s cardinal direction - “to 
the things themselves”. Heidegger alleges that 
Husserl determines the meaning of  ‘thing’ according 
to a traditional preconception; in doing so Husserl 
fails to bracket the naturalistic concept of ‘being’ and 
reduces consciousness to a natural being in the world, 
instead of existentially being-in-the-world. Dahlstrom 
asks, 
How fair is Heidegger’s criticism? On the 
one hand, despite his enthusiasm for 
Husserl’s intentional analysis of knowing, 
Heidegger’s criticism effectively discounts 
the essential role Husserl accords the mere, 
or even empty, intending of things in the 
constitution of primary significance of 
‘truth’ and ‘being’. Yet this fundamental 
feature of Husserl’s analysis belies the 
reproach that he crudely equates being with 
sheer presence. Heidegger’s critical 
exposition of Husserl’s phenomenology is, 
moreover, highly selective, ignoring several 
other nuances and details of its analyses and 
development. On the other hand, … there 
are certainly grounds for Heidegger’s 
contention that the basic structure of 
objectifying acts or, more specifically, an 
ontology of presence dominates the horizon 
against which accounts are given of truth, 
being, and intentionality. (ibid, p. 239) 
There is some evidence that in the Logical 
Investigations and Ideas First Book the basic structure 
of ‘objects’ of intentional acts are construed within an 
ontological frame of presence, a schema that accords 
primacy to the givenness of ‘objects’ as lying over 
against consciousness. But in attempting to overcome 
Husserl’s alleged position on this large-scale issue, 
Heidegger deploys another formal schema, the 
temporal horizon of human being, without 
acknowledging Husserl’s long-running, meticulous 
investigations of inner time. Dahlstrom responds on 
Husserl’s behalf against Heidegger’s spurious claims: 
Husserl plainly addresses the ultimate 
horizon for objectifying acts that is 
accordingly itself neither an object nor an 
act. There is still a kind of consciousness 
involved, but it is not the objectifying 
consciousness of intentionality that 
Heidegger criticized as prejudicially 
scientific; if anything, internal time 
consciousness is pre-scientific, even ‘pre-
objective’, starkly contrasting with the 
sketch Heidegger gives in his lectures of 
Husserl’s account of intentionality. Nor is 
Heidegger unaware of this significance. In 
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the preface to the published part of these 
manuscripts he writes that what is 
particularly telling about them is “the 
growing, fundamental clarification of 
intentionality in general”, a remark that must 
have surprised the students who listened to 
him during the summer semester of 1925. 
(ibid, pp. 239-40) 
Various reasons have been advanced for why the 
younger philosopher remained silent about the elder 
thinker’s outstripping these criticisms; but 
irrespective of the motive or rationale, it is clearly the 
case that Heidegger both misrepresents Husserl’s 
position and obviates the grounds for his 
disagreement. 
Rudolf Bernet has advanced an argument to show that 
another central feature of Husserl’s approach, one that 
Heidegger explicitly repudiated, is at work in Being 
and Time. In the late 1920s and early 1930s Husserl 
blamed the existential version of phenomenology, and 
especially Heidegger, for abandoning the most 
important and fundamental point of method, the 
phenomenological reduction. Husserl’s comment and 
Heidegger’s supposed condemnation have entered 
academic folklore, the oral record of this period of 
dissension and overthrow. One can then imagine the 
astonished and puzzled reaction when the published 
version of Heidegger’s contemporary lectures 
appeared in 1975. Here Heidegger said that, “the 
phenomenological reduction is the basic component 
of the phenomenological method.” Although he 
distanced himself from Husserl’s transcendental 
version of the reduction, he extols his own existential 
version: 
For us, phenomenological reduction means 
leading phenomenological vision back to the 
apprehension of being, whatever may be the 
character of that apprehension, to the 
understanding of the being of this being 
(projecting upon the way it is unconcealed). 
Bernet argues that not only is the reduction at work in 
Being and Time, but that as Heidegger construes his 
own version, it is not that different from Husserl’s 
more mature version, one worked out with his 
assistant Eugen Fink. In the Sixth Cartesian 
Meditation, the task of the reduction is 
to bring to light the “transcendental” correlation 
between constituting consciousness and the 
constituted world. And it is true that making this 
correlation manifest also means showing that it 
was already at work in the anonymity of 
‘natural’ life without natural life realizing it. But 
this in no way gives Heidegger the right to say, 
as he does repeatedly, that Husserl is not 
interested in the issue of the being of constituting 
consciousness. On the contrary, by revealing the 
correlation between constituting consciousness 
on the one hand and the constituted world on the 
other, the phenomenological reduction thus 
makes manifest precisely the (pre-)being of this 
consciousness and the being of this world as well 
as the difference between them. (Bernet, in 
Kisiel & van Buren, 1994, p. 255) 
Merleau-Ponty observed that 
far from being … a procedure of idealistic 
philosophy, phenomenological reduction clearly 
belongs to existential philosophy; Heidegger’s 
being-in-the-world appears only against the 
background of the phenomenological reduction. 
(1962, p. xiv) 
Bernet’s exegesis is not designed to show that 
Heidegger’s use of the reduction is the same as 
Husserl’s use, nor that their conception has the same 
ground and orientation. For Heidegger, Dasein’s 
natural life assumes the form of circumspective 
concern with available items in its familiar 
environment. In the ordinary course of events Dasein 
does not pay attention to the way in which equipment 
refers to the world or to its own concernful existence, 
nor to the way in which this existence inserts itself 
into the world. When natural life malfunctions and 
things go wrong the first reduction reveals the 
correlation between Dasein’s inauthentic or improper 
existence and the world to which it and the items it 
uses refer. In line with the Sixth Cartesian Meditation, 
this first existential reduction 
makes manifest the equipment’s intrawordly 
being in its relation to the being-in the-world 
of concernful Dasein, reveals the hidden 
being of the world and Dasein, their 
difference and their bond. 
The revised Husserlian version of the transcendental 
reduction takes another step in elucidating the being 
of the subject by asserting that the subject’s life is not 
limited to its constituting activity. By bringing out the 
hidden work of the world’s constitution, the next step 
“effects a split within this subject”; it is both the 
constituting subject and an observer of the activity of 
this constitution, an observer that does not pre-exist in 
its natural life. 
While one may speak of constituting 
consciousness operating unknowingly within 
natural life, there is no phenomenological 
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spectator that does not know itself, that is, 
does not know what it is doing. (This same 
point regarding the Sixth Cartesian Meditation 
is made by Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. xx.) 
Bernet draws the inference from Heidegger’s 
employment of an existential version of the second 
reduction, that Heidegger indeed must reach similar 
conclusions; in doing so Bernet clearly puts his finger 
on one of the most distinctive existential themes – 
anxiety.  
In the experience of anxiety, Dasein realizes 
how ridiculous and futile its unceasing 
concern for things within-the-world can be. 
In anxiety and especially the call of 
conscience, Dasein discovers itself divided 
between, on the one hand, the flight into the 
everyday affairs of worldly life … and, on 
the other, the care it preserves for its own 
proper potentiality-for-being. Even if 
anxiety cannot abolish Dasein’s being-in-
the-world and eradicate the world as such, 
the fact remains that the concerns by means 
of which Dasein usually fits into a familiar, 
anonymous, and common world are put 
aside. Like the phenomenological reduction 
in Husserl and Fink, anxiety therefore sees 
to it that Dasein, when confronting itself and 
alone with itself, meets for the first time not 
only a new self, but also the phenomenon of 
its own authentic or proper being. (ibid, p. 
256) 
Bernet also argues that the revised Husserlian 
reduction provides an insight into another distinctive 
existential theme – the leap into a higher realm – 
through the difference uncovered between worldly 
beings and the being of constitutive consciousness. 
The ontological difference between the two 
requires a “leap” (sprung). But this leap out 
of natural life is ventured, dared by the 
subject who wants to know more, who wants 
to have a clear mind, who wants to give a 
verdict in the name of scientific evidence. 
There is nothing of this sort in Heidegger. 
(ibid, p. 258) 
In addition to the above, Husserl’s doctrine of 
categorical intuition governs Heidegger’s problematic 
of fundamental ontology at its very core, including 
the preeminent question about the self (subject or 
Dasein), according to Jacques Taminiaux (in Kisiel & 
van Buren, 1994). Heidegger directed his students, 
and later readers, without overt criticism, to the Sixth 
Logical Investigation, “Expression and Signification”, 
where Husserl draws an important distinction 
between significance (or reference, in the more 
standard English translation) and the symbolic. At the 
root of this distinction is the difference between 
authentic presentation of an ‘object” in propria 
persona, and the inauthentic presentation by means of 
mediate entities of more complex ‘objects’. In the 
Introduction to Being and Time the author places 
great emphasis on the notion of indication insofar as it 
falls under appearance (Erscheinung), itself the root 
sense of the idea of phenomenon, defined as “the 
occurrences which show themselves and which in this 
very self showing ‘indicate’ something that does not 
show itself.” Taminiaux says that 
it is not unjustified to decipher Heidegger’s 
distinction of Erscheinung as a mere 
terminological transposition of the Husserlian 
description of Anzeige, indication…. These 
expressions are nevertheless interchangeable, 
for they respectively signify the same thing. 
(ibid, pp. 271-272; see van Buren, 1994, pp. 
207-208)  
In his History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger 
credits Husserl with three important discoveries: 
intentionality, categorical intuition, and the apriori. 
Taminiaux has scrupulously examined the points of 
supposed divergence between the two thinkers, and 
draws the following parallel about the close 
equivalence between the subject and Dasein. 
Husserl, it goes without saying, does not name 
this nothingness [the soul as the world’s 
supplement]; nothingness is simply not one of 
his themes. For Heidegger, however, it became 
imperative to name this “supplementary 
nothingness” and to make it a central theme 
precisely in accordance with his ontologization 
of Husserl’s discoveries, especially the 
categorical intuition of being. This discovery 
teaches us that being is not a real predicate, 
that therefore it has nothing in common with 
beings, and that it nevertheless gives itself to a 
seeing in this very difference. If the 
understanding of being is the task of 
phenomenology, then the epoché ought at the 
same time to assume the appearance of a 
reduction to nothingness [néantisation]. And if 
this understanding … concerns each Dasein in 
its mineness at the level of what it is 
proximally and for the most part, in the same 
way that Husserl’s transcendental ego is what 
the empirical ego presupposes, then it is 
imperative to demonstrate at various depths 
the ontic and pre-ontological attestation of this 
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ontological reduction to nothing that 
constitutes a metamorphosed epoché. 
In the intimate knowledge which this inner seeing 
demands the authentic being of the self stands forth, 
and this shows that the phenomenon and the logos are 
joined in one self-directed intuition; in doing this, 
“Heidegger remains faithful to the spirit of Husserl” 
(ibid, pp. 286-287; also identified by Merleau-Ponty, 
1962, p. 426). 
Given the foregoing examination of congruent 
perspectives on core ideas in the phenomenological 
analysis of self and world, it is little wonder that 
Husserl wrote in the margin of his own copy of Being 
and Time that, “Everything here is a translation and 
transposition of my thought” (Husserl, 1997). With 
his unprecedented knowledge of Husserl’s 
unpublished manuscripts at the time, Merleau-Ponty 
could make the highly confident assertion as early as 
1945: 
the whole of Sein and Zeit springs from an 
indication given by Husserl and amounts to no 
more than an explicit account of the 
naturlicher weltbegriff [natural concept of 
world] or the Lebenswelt [lifeworld] which 
Husserl, towards the end of his life, identified 
as the central theme of phenomenology, with 
the result that the contradiction reappears in 
Husserl’s own philosophy. (1962, p. vii) 
In his minute discussion of the spatial ‘sense’ of one’s 
own body, Merleau-Ponty reiterates this doctrinal 
diagnosis: 
In our opinion Husserl’s originality lies 
beyond the notion of intentionality; it is to be 
found in the elaboration of this notion and in 
the discovery, beneath the intentionality of 
representation, of a deeper intentionality, 
which others have called existence. (1962, p. 
121 note 5)  
One cannot imagine the existentialist project for 
articulating the concept of corporeal intentionality 
and the motile actions of the lived-body, for example 
in Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, without the exceptional 
recasting of the terms of debate in Husserl’s Ideas 
Second Book. Husserl rejected the false dilemma that 
an explanation of mind-body union must be either an 
interactive account or some version of parallelism. He 
radically recasts the terms of the standard debate by 
introducing two terms for body, the object or inert-
body (Korper) and the lived-body (Leben); the first is 
the subject-matter of physical sciences such as 
medicine and biology, the second is the subject’s 
matter through which the human being lives in the 
world (see D. W. Smith, in Smith & Smith, 1995, pp. 
323-327). In this context, Husserl’s key concept of 
intentionality undergoes a transformation into 
comportment, the same term that Heidegger uses in 
his critique or overcoming of Husserl’s ‘pure’ 
phenomenology, and the same sense conveyed by 
Sartre’s concept of conduct. The notion of 
comportment in Ideas Book Two refers to the most 
pervasive, most general manner in which embodied 
conscious beings orient themselves in the surround-
world (Husserl, 1989, pp. 201-202). In addition, the 
originary apprehension of other conscious beings in 
an inter-subjective community allows for empathy  
accomplished as one with the originary 
experience of the [lived] body as indeed a kind 
of presentification, one that nevertheless 
serves to ground the character of co-existence 
in the flesh. (Husserl, 1989, p. 208) 
The internal states of embodied beings who are the 
source of their own motivation are basic moods or 
affective adjustments to the surround-world, in a 
sense similar to Heidegger’s concept of attunement 
(Befindlichkeit). Husserl says that there are two layers 
to the personal ego, one is the intellectual agent, the 
free ego of its free acts, but also there is the personal 
underlying basis, constituted from associations, 
drives, feelings and tendencies that are played out by 
an embodied being. These are habitual modes of 
behavior, properties of the person as an individual, 
and this individuality is 
the total style and habitus of the subject, 
pervading as a concordant unity all his 
modes of behavior, all his activities and 
passivities, and to which the entire psychic 
basis constantly contributes. (Husserl, 1989, 
p. 290) 
Husserl’s thought here reaches back to Nietzsche’s 
assertion that a free spirit’s optimal control of its 
drives appears as a personal style (Gay Science, sec. 
290), and reaches forward to Merleau-Ponty’s famous 
claim that an individual’s movements through the 
lifeworld are characterized by a personal style 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 85, 150, 180, 281). 
Given the Existentialists’ claim that Husserl’s vision 
of phenomenology as an exact science of essences 
constrains him to an interpretation of everything 
under the heading of timeless, fixed essences, the 
following statement from the final section of Ideas 
Second Book may come as a shock. According to an 
objective assessment of the thing-like qualities of 
things, is it not the case that how some thing can 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 1, Edition 1        April 2001 Page 10 of 13 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This document is subject to 
copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the 
publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
behave, and further, how it will behave, is pre-
delineated by its own essence? 
But does each thing … have such an essence 
of its own in the first place? Or is the thing, 
as it were, always underway, not at all 
graspable therefore in pure Objectivity, but 
rather in virtue of its relation to subjectivity, 
in principle only a relatively identical 
something, which does not have its essence 
in advance or graspable once and for all, but 
instead has an open essence, one that can 
always take on new properties according to 
the constitutive circumstances of givenness? 
But this is precisely the problem, to 
determine more exactly the sense of this 
openness, as regards, specifically the 
“Objectivity” of natural science. (Husserl, 
1989, pp. 312-313) 
He goes on to state clearly that consciousness is the 
universal characteristic of the spiritual (or psychical) 
dimension of human being and that, as such, it has an 
essence, an essence that eidetic analysis is designed to 
reveal. But human being also has an underlying basis 
in its lived body and habitus; it is this basic stratum 
that serves to individuate each person in his or her 
individuality, and, as such, the human person does not 
have an essence in advance, but instead is underway, 
a being open to its future. 
The pregivenness of the world signifies the 
persistency of a universal world-conviction, a 
world-possession, which at the same time is a 
presumption of being and is always givenness 
of being, indeed as givenness of a being which 
has its true being only ahead of itself. (Husserl, 
1989, p. 363) 
From my standpoint, this statement is a clear 
precursor to Existentialist claims made by Heidegger, 
Sartre and Jaspers that Dasein is underway, ahead of 
itself, and open to the future. In the Fourth Appendix 
to the Crisis of European Sciences, Husserl clearly 
links his concept of the individual not having an 
essence in advance, an embodied being that is 
underway and always becoming, to the core concept 
of an internal, self-realized freedom – and, in doing 
so, clearly captures the Existentialist concept of 
freedom (see especially Edie 1984). 
This life, as personal life, is a constant 
becoming through a constant intentionality of 
development. What becomes, in this life, is the 
person himself. His being is always forever 
becoming…. Human personal life proceeds in 
stages … up to the point of seizing in 
consciousness the idea of autonomy, the idea 
of a resolve of the will to shape one’s whole 
personal life into the synthetic unity of a life of 
universal self-responsibility and, correlatively, 
to shape oneself into the true “I”, the free, 
autonomous “I” which seeks to realize his 
innate reason, the striving to be true to himself, 
to be able to remain identical with himself as a 
reasonable “I”. (Husserl, 1970, p. 338) 
On the rare occasions when Husserl reflects on the 
possible ground which could motivate the philosopher 
to perform the phenomenological reduction he refers 
to “the irrational fact of the world’s rationality” 
(Bernet, Kern, & Marbach, 1992, p. 10), and the 
“clarification of the world leads back to the task of 
systematically setting out the final irrationality of the 
world-constituting consciousness” (Husserl, in Nenon 
& Embree, 1996, p. 12). From my point of view this 
startling remark gestures toward the radical 
contingency at the basis of human existence, albeit in 
this instance, the uniquely human feature of 
questioning the tacit thesis about the world’s being. 
This ungrounded ground is not far from 
Kierkegaard’s reflections on the deeply disturbing 
apprehension of the absurd, and Nietzsche’s 
vertiginous gazing into the abyss. Even more 
existentially flavored is Husserl’s immediate response 
to the challenge posed by this utter lack of inherent 
reason, namely, the resolve to carry through with the 
reduction and all that this entails; philosophical 
determination conducted under the title of “my fullest 
freedom”. 
Note: An earlier, much shorter version of this 
article appeared in the Introduction to The 
Existentialist Reader, Edinburgh University 
Press, 2000. 
__________________
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